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The Quiet Revolution Redux: How Selected
Local Governments Have Fared
DAVID L. CALLIES*

I.

Introduction

This country is in the midst of a revolution in the way we regulate the use of our land. It is a peaceful revolution, conducted
entirely within the law ....

The ancient regime being over-

thrown is the feudal system under which the entire pattern of
land development has been controlled by thousands of individual local governments, each seeking to maximize its tax base
and minimize its social problems, and caring less what happens
to all the others.
The tools of the revolution are new laws taking a wide variety of
forms but each sharing a common theme - the need to provide
some degree of state or regional participation in the major decisions that affect the use of our increasingly limited supply of
land.1
So began the introduction to The Quiet Revolution in Land
Use Control. As the rest of that introduction indicates, the purpose of the study was to discuss and analyze the new laws enacted
by selected states, all of which "took back" some of the police
power authority conferred upon local government to regulate
the use of land. The study summarized six issues that recurred throughout the nine principal 2 and seven secondary 3 state
* FAICP; Benjamin A. Kudo Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of
Law, University of Hawaii; J.D., U. Michigan; LL.M., U. Nottingham. The author
gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments by Dan Mandelker and the research
assistance of Heidi Guth, a 2002 graduate of the William S. Richardson School of Law.
1. FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID L. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE
CONTROL 1 (1971).
2. Hawaii, Vermont, San Francisco Bay, Twin Cities, Massachusetts (twice),
Maine, Wisconsin, and the New England River Basin.
3. Alaska Joint State-Federal Natural Resources and Land Use Planning Commission, Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, Hackensack Meadowlands Development
Commission, Adirondack Park Agency, Delaware Coastal Zone Act, Colorado Land
Use Act, and the Washington Land Planning Commission.
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land use regimes
4
were:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

upon which the study reported.

[Vol. 20
These

A new concept of land;
A new role for the state;
A reduced role for local government;
A balancing of planning and regulation;
Constitutional limits on regulation; and
Choice of state agency.

Much has changed since 1970, 5 when the research for The
Quiet Revolution finished. First, local governments have vastly
improved their planning processes in many parts of the country;
the rationale for preserving land has changed in some states. Second, the legal landscape for challenging land use controls on constitutional grounds has shifted considerably. At the time of our
Quiet Revolution study, federal courts had declined to so much as
entertain a regulatory taking challenge in nearly half a century,
since Justice Holmes penned his famous language about the constitutional impropriety of a regulation that went "too far."6 State
courts, which heard such challenges uniformly, found exceptions
to the "too far" federal regulatory takings rule, so that by the mid1970s, the rule was virtually moribund. 7 Today, however, the constitutionality of land use controls that strip a landowner of all economically beneficial use of land is questionable following nearly a
dozen U.S. Supreme Court cases on per se and partial regulatory
takings, and unconstitutional land development regulations,
many of which involve state-wide land development regulations.
It is therefore, worth a look not only at how selected cities, villages, counties, and other local governments are coping with land
use issues, but also at the new judicial climate, to see what has
changed.

4. BOSSELMAN & CALLIES, supra note 1, at 314-26.

5. For a recent summary of state programs see ROBERT H. FREILICH, FROM
SPRAWL TO SMART GROWTH: SUCCESSFUL LEGAL, PLANNING, AND ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS 209-52 (1999).
6. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
7. FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKING ISSUE chs. 1-4, 9, 16 (1973).
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II.

Quiet Revolution Country: Have Things Changed?
A Selective Look.

A. Honolulu, Hawaii, Where "It All Began"
Hawaii was the centerpiece of The Quiet Revolution, where "it
all began."" Hawaii passed its bellwether (but not trend-setting)
statewide land use law dividing all the land in the state into four
districts (agriculture, conservation, urban, and rural) in 1961. 9
The law gave a state administrative agency, the Land Use Commission ("LUC"), basic authority over land development patterns 10 by leaving it to the LUC to make the basic decisions about
whether land should be developed (urban zone)," conserved as
watersheds and so forth (conservation) 12 or used principally for
agriculture (agriculture).13 The purpose of the law was primarily
to protect agriculture lands, used primarily for large sugar and
pineapple plantations, from urban sprawl. 14 The LUC still fulfills
this role, and the percentage of land in each classification has
changed almost imperceptibly over the past thirty years, with the
vast majority of the state's land evenly split between the conservation zone (48%) and the agriculture zone (48%). 15 Indeed, a look
at the land use maps in Oahu, formally the City and County of
Honolulu-the most heavily populated (by far) of the state's four
major island counties--clearly demonstrates that land development patterns have remained largely the same. There has been
incremental growth in existing urban areas, with the exception of
the new "second city" of Kapolei, sprouting west of Pearl Harbor
on former plantation agricultural land. 16 Much of the watershed
remains in the conservation district under the control of another
17
state agency, the Department of Land and Natural Resources,
whose Land Board divides that substantial acreage into a series of
subzones and permits very limited (usually single-family homes
8. BOSSELMAN & CALLIES, supra note 1, at 5.
9.

HAw. REV. STAT. § 205-2(a) (2001).

10. Id. § 205-1.
11. Id. § 205-2(a)(1).
12. Id. § 205-2(e).

13. Id. § 205-2(a)(3).
14. See id. § 205-2(a)(3).
15. See DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 690 (3d ed.
1999).
16. See generally Kapolei, Hawaii, available at http://www.kapolei.com/
home.html (describing the location and plans for the area, with current and future
maps) (last visited June 3, 2002).
17. See HAw. REV. STAT. § 205-5(a) (2001); HAw. REV. STAT. § 183-31 (2000).
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on large tracts) use in only one, the so-called "general" subzone
(although in the past the Board has permitted both a golf course
and a college campus on conservation land).' 8 While the state's
four counties (it has no cities, villages or any other units of local
government) share the power over land use in the agriculture zone
(a matter of some contention, as appears below), it is only in the
urban zone19-less than 4% of the state's land area-that the counties act free of the LUC's authority and control.
While it is arguable that the LUC has fulfilled its statutory
purpose, many question whether it has not served its purpose and
should be eliminated. 20 This is for several reasons. First, there is
virtually no significant plantation agriculture remaining in the
state. 2 1 Only a single major island, Oahu, has significant acreage
in such large-scale agriculture-pineapple-and only two sugar
plantations remain, one on Kauai and the other on Maui. 22 The
agriculture zone has therefore become largely an open space holding zone increasingly vulnerable to attack under Lucas v. South
CarolinaCoastal Council2 3 as a taking of property because there
is no economically beneficial use permitted on much of the land so
classified. 24 What limited, relatively large-lot residential development is permitted in the zone is just that - limited, usually to
high-end residential development. Even that is under attack by
many who would like to preserve the land and challenge the common county perception that residential use divorced from "real"
agricultural production is in fact a permissible use in an agricultural district. 25 Golf courses are a permitted use on much of the
land, either by right or as a special use on prime agricultural
land, 2 6 but with well over fifty golf courses in the state and tour-

18. DAVID L. CALLIES, PRESERVING PARADISE: WHY REGULATION WON'T WORK 19-

20 (1994).
19. HAw. REV. STAT. § 205-2(b) (2001).
20. CALLIES ET AL, supra note 15, at 691.
21. See CALLIES, supra note 18, at 12.
22. See Anthony Sommer, Final Harvest for Sugar Fields, THE HONOLULU STAR
BULLETIN, Nov. 16, 2000, available at http://starbulletin.com/2000/11/16/news/
story3.html.
23. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
24. See id.
25. Testimony of Christopher Yuen, Planning Director of the County of Hawaii, In
re Appeal of Continental Properties (Zoning Board of Appeals Nov. 9, 2001) (on file
with author).

26. HAw. REV. STAT. § 205-2(d) (2001).
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ism in a long slump, the market for such courses is in the main
27
saturated.
The conservation district is the second of the two large land
classifications by the state LUC. It consists of both public and private land (some estimate that as much as half is private) and
amounts to nearly half the land area of the state. 28 Controlled
exclusively by the board of directors of the Department of Land
and Natural Resources (DLNR), the district originally consisted
primarily of forest and water reserve zones (initially named and
established as such 29 ) and lands for the preservation of historic
and scenic areas. These lands are used for conserving wildlife,
providing park lands, wilderness and beach reserves, preventing
floods, and as "open space areas whose existing openness, natural
condition, or present state of use, if retained, would enhance the
present or potential value of abutting or surrounding communities, or would maintain or enhance the conservation of natural or
' 30
scenic resources.
The conservation district is regulated by the governing Board
of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR or Land Board) of the
DLNR. The Land Board has, by administrative rule, divided the
conservation district into four so-called "subzones" and permits
various land uses in each, all as authorized by statute. 3 1 Also by
statute, these uses may include not only farming and the operation of nurseries and orchards, but also "recreational pursuits"
and residential uses.32 There are currently four subzones: protected, limited, resource, and general. Regulations promulgated
by the Land Board set out the uses permitted in each.3 3 The first
two subzones are more or less self-descriptive. The protected subzone is to protect valuable resources in such designated areas as
restricted watershed, marine, plant, and wildlife sanctuaries; significant historical, archaeological, geological, and volcanological
features and sites; and other unique areas. The primary permit27. OFFICE OF STATE PLANNING, GOLF COURSE DEVELOPMENT IN HAWAII: IMPACTS
AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (1992).
28. DAVID L. CALLIES, REGULATING PARADISE: LAND USE CONTROLS IN HAWAII 9
(1984); Madalyn Purcell, Residential Use of Hawaii's Conservation Districts, 14 U.
HAW. L. REV. 633 (1992).
29. HAW. REV. STAT. § 183-41 (as modified by amendments to HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 205-2).
30. Id. § 205-2(e).
31. Id. § 205-2.
32. Id.
33. HAW. ADMIN. RULES § 13-5-10 to 25; see also CALLIES, REGULATING PARADISE,
supra note 28, at 9.
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ted uses in a protected subzone are research, education, and some
recreation, as long as no permanent facilities are contemplated.
The limited subzone is for areas in which natural conditions restrict human activity (40 percent slopes, flooding, volcanic activity), with timber harvesting and flood control added. The resource
subzone adds aquaculture to the list of permitted uses. The general subzone adds very little more "of right": water collection and
storage, and transmission facilities. Only in special subzones and
by means of conditional permits, variances, and nonconformities
are economic uses besides agriculture, forestry, and aquaculture
permitted.
The capacity of the four counties for effective land use control
has increased significantly, and as each such local government
has regional jurisdiction which stops, if at all, at the ocean (two
counties have jurisdiction over other than their main island base),
the continued utility of a statewide body overseeing such land use
decisions-at least for the reasons originally articulated-is
weak. 34 Thus, all three of the so-called "neighbor island" counties
(Kauai, Maui and Hawaii) have separate and well-staffed planning departments as well as sophisticated general and area-specific plans with a strong and detailed land use component. 35 Oahu
has, for at least twenty-five years, used a comprehensive and
lengthy land use ordinance to control the use of land, which by
charter must conform to both general and area-specific development plans. 36 The latter were once so specific as to resemble zoning ordinances in their own right, complete with nearly a dozen
district classifications mapped at a micro scale down to the street
and block level.3 7 What, then, is the need for overseeing state

agencies to second-guess their regional land use planning and regulatory decisions?
B.

Portland, Oregon

Oregon, at the forefront of the Smart Growth movement,
mandated in 1975 that local governments must control urban
sprawl and protect open space. 38 The general strategy involved
creating boundaries beyond which urban growth could not extend,
34.
35.
36.
37.

CALLIES ET. AL., supra note 15, at 690-91.

Id.

CALLIES, supra note 18, at 24.
CALLIES ET. AL., supra note 15, at 690-91.
38. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.005-.860 (1999).
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thus compacting development and protecting rural areas. 3 9 The
comprehensive state plan required each city and county to create
and implement its own plans in compliance with the state's
nineteen goals, and established a seven-member Land and Development Commission (LDC) to oversee conformity of local governments' plans and land use controls. 40 If the local government
plans comply, the LDC "acknowledges" the plans, and if they do
not, there is generally time for adjustments. 4 1 If the LDC does not
acknowledge a local plan (which has not yet happened), the local
planning decisions must be based on the statewide goals. 4 2 Upon
acknowledgement, the local plans and regulations are imple43
mented equally, and thereby bind state agencies.
Concurrent with the legislation and enactment of the statewide land use plan, the Oregon Supreme Court decided that local
zoning ordinances may be more restrictive, but not less, than the
comprehensive plan for a certain region. 44 The Oregon Supreme
Court also found passage of statewide land use plans, which
meant that all land use and zoning laws must comply with the
45
state's legislated goals.
For example, Portland's Urban Growth Boundary Program
(UGB) provides that Portland residents elect a regional government called the Metropolitan Service District (Metro) that regulates land use and development in twenty-four adjoining cities
and three counties. 46 Most new construction is denied beyond the
Urban Growth Boundary, which follows a twenty-minute radius
from downtown Portland. 47 Metro has denied building permission
39. See id. §§ 197.005, 197.010.
40. See id. § 197.075.
41. Id. § 197.040.
42. See id. § 197.180.
43. See id.
44. Fasano v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973) (finding that although a county planning commission may revise a comprehensive plan to keep up
with the times, changes must only be made when adequately justified and when they
are consistent with the character of the area and with the original objectives of the
plan); Baker v. City of Milwaukee, 533 P.2d 772, 779 (Or. 1975) (holding that the
comprehensive plan may be changed according to a community's needs, but the zoning ordinances must comply and conform with the plan); see also Marracci v. City of
Scappoose, 552 P.2d 552, 553 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that a comprehensive plan
sets the maximum, but not the minimum land use intensity; the latter may be set by
zoning ordinances).
45. Foland v. Jackson County, 807 P.2d 801, 803 (Or. 1991).
46. See Bernard H. Siegan, Smart Growth and Other Infirmities of Land Use Controls, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 693, 717 (2001).
47. See id. at 717-18.
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to conglomerates such as Wal-Mart and Home Depot, 48 as well as
begun efforts to reduce maximum lot sizes for single-family
homes, 4 9 promote high-rise construction, and reduce individual
automobile traffic. 50 A problem with deciding where to build and
at what density involves balancing outcomes. 51 Low-density development inside the boundaries promotes requests for UGB extensions, while higher density development inside the boundary
52
drives up prices, and forces low-income housing to the edges.
The Metro 2040 Growth Concept, an effort to balance the opposing
development pressures, supplements the state goals. 53 Metro
2040 requires local governments to meet housing capacity standards and gives first priority to boundary expansions that provide
the most efficient and effective urban services. 5 4 Portland's housing prices continue to climb, and the city is one of the state's most
expensive, which can be seen as either a detriment to those who
live there or as a testament that the plan works because so many
55
people want to live there.
Land use disputes from local, regional, and state levels go
before the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA). 56 Many of these
disputes originate in the Portland area, and most of the decisions
have come down on the side of the Metro and for managed, not
stunted, growth.5 7 As long as the land use conforms with current
48. See id. at 718.
49. See Metro, Regional Affordable Housing, at http://www.metro-region.org/
growth/tfplanaffordable.html (last updated May 31, 2001).
50. See Metro, 2040 Concepts for Growth: TransportationElement, at http://www.
metro-region.org/transpo/growthlink/transgrowthlink.html (last updated Dec. 15,
1999); see also PORTLAND, OR. METRO. CODE § 3.01.010(e) (1993).
51. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Managing Space to Manage Growth, 23 WM. &
MARY ENVT'L. L. & POL'Y REV. 801, 816 (1999).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 816-17.
54. Id. at 817; see also PORTLAND, OR. METRO. CODE §§ 3.01.010(e)(1), (2).
55. See SIEGAN, supra note 46, at 718-19,
56. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.825 (1999).
57. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass'n of Metro. Portland v. Portland Metro. Area Local Gov't Boundary Comm'n, 4 OR. LUBA 245, 247-52 (1981) (upholding the Metro's
denial of a land annexation petition because of a lack of school facilities); Atwood v.
City of Portland, 2 OR. LUBA 397, 403-04 (1981) (denying a request to reverse a zoning change that allowed for a 31-unit apartment because the change met goals for
encouraging residential infill in areas with adequate facility support); Tichy v. Portland City Council, 6 OR. LUBA 13, 24 (1982) (upholding a zoning change that met the
comprehensive plan's goal for the area); City of Wilsonville v. Metro. Serv. Dist., 15
OR. LUBA 44, 48-53 (1986) (affirming a denial of annexation of 46 rural acres within
the Metro UGB because the land would not be an efficient use of land); and BenjFran
Dev., Inc. v. Metro. Serv. Dist., 15 OR. LUBA 319, 321-29 (1987) (upholding denial of
request for major amendment to UGB).
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zoning regulations, land within the UGB is available for controlled growth, while from LUBA's perspective, land outside the
UGB should as remaining rural and essentially undeveloped. 58
The boundary line remains relatively inflexible, unless it is
found to meet statewide goal requirements. 59 Recently, for example, the state appellate court upheld a LUBA decision to add 354
congruent acres to the Metro UGB both because state law requires
Metro to ensure enough "urbanizable" land for twenty years of
residential building, and because most of the land added had been
60
designated as next in priority to be included in the Metro area.
One of the few LUBA cases involving Metro that the Oregon Court
of Appeals has not affirmed was one in which Metro tried to comply with the requirement of providing enough residential land for
the future, expanding the UGB solely in one sub-region, without
considering the entire region's need or explaining why the particular sub-region needed as much as 830 additional acres. 61 The appellate court has found a distinct need for consistency between
Metro's planning documents on the regional and local level (regional functional plan and an urban growth report) when deciding
62
whether to expand the UGB.

On November 7, 2000, Oregonians passed, by fifty-four percent of the vote, a ballot measure calling for a constitutional
amendment that would require state and local government compensation to landowners whose property values were reduced be58. See

MANDELKER, supra note 51, at 814.
59. These statewide goal requirements cause local governments to apply the
seven following factors in determining the size of the UGB:
1. Demonstrated need to accommodate long-range urban population
growth requirements consistent with [Land Conservation and Development Commission] goals;
2. Need for housing, employment opportunities, and livability;
3. Orderly and economic provision for public facilities and services;
4. Maximum efficiency of land uses within and on the fringe of the existing urban area;
5. Environmental, energy, economic and social consequences;
6. Retention of agricultural land as defined, with Class I being the highest priority for retention and Class VI the lowest priority; and
7. Compatibility of the proposed urban uses with nearby agricultural
activities.
DEPARTMENT OF LAND CONSERVATION & DEVELOPMENT, OREGON'S STATEWIDE PLANNING GOALS AND GUIDELINES (1995).
60. Citizens Against Irresponsible Growth v. Metro, 38 P.3d 956 (Or. Ct. App.
2002).
61. Residents of Rosemont v. Metro, 21 P.3d 1108 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
62. See 1,000 Friends of Oregon v. Metro, 26 P.3d 151 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
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cause of land regulations and development restrictions. 63 The
measure sets no payment limits and would require compensation
for property value loss and for costs incurred in required environmental, historical, archaeological, cultural or low income housing
preservation. 64 The following month, when the measure was to
take effect, a trial court issued a temporary injunction preventing
the measure from taking affect. In February 2000, the court
struck down the measure in a consolidated case on state constitutional grounds because the initiative did not include all the language in the final measure, and the measure contained several
different provisions that should have been voted upon separately. 65 In March 2000, the court declared that the measure was
not part of the constitution, and authors of the measure appealed
to the Oregon Supreme Court, with oral arguments heard on Sep66
tember 11, 2001, and a decision expected in mid-2002.
C.

Florida

From the late 1960s through the early 1970s, Florida began
enacting statutes to manage, distribute and control growth, partly
in an effort to preserve natural resources that had been damaged
or destroyed in previous decades: 67 Florida Air and Water Pollution Control Act (1967),68 County and Municipal Planning for Future Development Act (1969),69 Beach and Shore Preservation Act
(1971),70 Florida Environmental Land and Water Management
Act (1972), 71 Florida Water Resources Act (1972),72 Florida State
Comprehensive Planning Act (1972), 73 and Land Conservation Act
(1972).74 These conservation acts provided a foundation for the
63. Measure 7, amending OR. CONST. art. I, § 18 by adding six subsections.
64. See Measure 7, § (e).
65. McCall v. Kitzhaber, No. 00C19871, slip. op. at 10, 18 (Or. Cir. Ct. Feb. 22,
2001); League of Or. Cities v. Oregon, No. 00C20156, slip. op. at 10, 18 (Or. Cir. Ct.
Feb. 22, 2001).
66. See Hunnicutt v. Myers, 39 P.3d 190, 191-92 (Or. 2002); see also David Steves,
Court Weighs Property Compensation Case, REGISTER-GUARD, Sept. 11, 2001, available at http://www.registerguard.com/news/20010911/ld.cr.measure7.0911.html (last
visited Apr. 14, 2002).
67. See James C. Nicholas & Ruth L. Steiner, Growth Management and Smart
Growth in Florida, 35 WAxE FOREST L. REV. 645, 650 (2000).
68. Id. at 650 (citing FLA. STAT. ch. 403.011 (1999).

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

FLA. STAT. ch. 163.3161 (2001).
Id. ch. 161.011.
Id. ch. 380.012.
Id. ch. 373.013.
Id. ch. 186.001.
Id. ch. 259.01.
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planning acts of the late 1970s and 1980s: 7 5 Local Government
Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act
(1975),76 State Comprehensive Plan (1985), 77 and Growth Management Act of 1985.78 Together, this legislation formed a planning system for the rapidly developing coastal state.
Under Florida's Environmental Land and Water Management Act (1972) 79 the state began designating areas of critical
state concern.8 0 There are now five such areas: the Big Cyprus
Conservation Act (1973),81 the Green Swamp Area (1974),82 the
Florida Keys Area Protection Act (1976),83 the City of Key West
(1976),84 and the Apalachicola Bay Area Protection Act (1979).85
Local governments and property owners fought these designations, particularly in the Florida Keys.8 6 Local governments perceived the designations as usurping their authority and
questioning their abilities.8 7 Property owners viewed the designations as taking some or all of their property and development
rights.8 8 Although Florida's Supreme Court upheld both the
state-designated areas of critical concern 8 9 and regional management of developments, 90 local governments continued to balk at
critical area designation. 9 1
In response, the state created an alternative: Resource Planning and Management Committees (RPMCs). 9 2 Local governments seemed to prefer this method, which incorporated elected
officials and property owners into the deciding committees. 93 For
example, RPMCs created "mutually acceptable development regulations for Charlotte Harbor, Hutchinson Island, and the Suwan75. See Nicholas & Steiner, supra note 67, at 650.
76. FLA. STAT. ch. 163.3161 (2001).

77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. ch. 187.101.
1985 Fla. Laws ch. 85-55.
FLA. STAT. ch. 380.012 (2001).
Id.

81.

FLA. STAT.

ch. 380.055.

82. Id. ch. 380.0551.
83. Id. ch. 380.0552.
84. See id.
85. FLA. STAT. ch. 380.0555 (2001).
86. See James C. Nicholas & Carol Crawford, The FloridaKeys: A Case Study of
CriticalArea Designation, FLA. ENVTL. & URB. ISSUES, June 1976, at 12.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978).
90. Graham v. Estuary Props., Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981).
91. See Nicholas & Crawford, supra note 86, at 12.
92. FLA. STAT. ch. 380.045 (2001).
93. See Nicholas & Steiner, supra note 67, at 654.
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nee River. '94 This process, although less contentious, is also no
longer used. 95 Both it and the designation process remain on the
96
books, however.
Regional Planning Councils review developments with regional impact (beyond one county).97 Applications for regional impact developments (DRIs) are lengthy and expensive. 98 The
process averages two years and costs millions of dollars because
the development must be approved by local, regional, and state
agencies. 99 Perhaps because of all the negotiations at the beginning of the process,' 00 however, most DRIs are approved, well
planned, and environmentally savvy. 1 1 The extensive approval
process also vests many development rights.' 0 2 Recent environmental complaints, however, center on the ability of many transportation and fuel companies to avoid the review.' 0 3
The Florida State and Regional Planning Act of 1984 mandated the state to create a comprehensive state development plan
and to assure that each of the eleven planning regions be consistent with that state plan. 10 4 The 1985 amendments then required
local governments to create and implement detailed development
plans that complied with the state and regional plans.'0 5 This laborious planning process is so detailed that it even includes requirements for services to be included in any development plans
at the local level. 10 6 The state pays for much of the required infrastructure, provided that the local plans manage growth properly
and that development occurs in areas already served by state
infrastructure. 0 7.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 654.
96. Id. at 655.
97. FLA. STAT. ch. 380.06(1) (2001).
98. See Nicholas & Steiner, supra note 67, at 655.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 655 n.100.
101. See id. at 656.
102. See FLA. STAT. ch. 380.06(26) (2001).
103. See Leon County v. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 666 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996) (interpreting the DRI statute narrowly to include only those developments
listed within the statute, even though the subject 22-mile petroleum pipeline (not part
of the statute) project included a storage facility (part of the statute), because the
facility would hold two percent less than the statute required for review); Christopher
C. Sanders, Environmental Law, 26 STETSON L. REV. 971 (1997).
104. FLA. STAT. ch. 186.001-.901.
105. See id. chs. 163.3161-.3215.
106. Id. ch. 163.3161(3).
107. Id. ch. 163.3177(10)(h).
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Florida's underlying concurrency premise is that the required
infrastructure for developments be in place before the impacts of
the development occur.1 0 8 This is exemplified by Florida's transportation management system, which began in the 1990s out of
the realization that transportation infrastructure was falling far
behind population growth.10 9 To confine urban development
within specified areas, Transportation Concurrency Management
Areas promote redevelopment of existing road networks to provide
more efficient public and private transit in urban areas.1 1 0 Community revitalization not only manages growth, but also saves
time and money. Thus, in 1999, amendments to the Growth Management Act allow for transportation concurrency exceptions if
the project provides only for urban redevelopment, and not expansion; develops multi-option transportation districts; exempts public transport from concurrency requirements; and provides for
exemptions if the developer contributes proportionate funds for
the traffic impacts."'
Growth management remains a work in progress in Florida.
Last year, a Florida appellate court wrote one of the strongest affirmations of a comprehensive land use plan;"12 but the year
before, Florida's governor expressed dissatisfaction with the state
plan. 113 Governor Jeb Bush created a Governor's Growth Management Study Commission in July 2000, which held public hearings in eight cities spanning the state trying to find ways around
what has become "a more complicated, more costly process" that
has not fulfilled its promise. 1 4 With an expected population increase of fifty percent in the next thirty years, the commission
sought to develop ideas for better growth management, infrastructure preparation, and resource preservation."15 The commission's
108. See Steven M. Seibert, Growth Management Programs: A Comparison of Selected States 11, availableat http://www.dca.state.fl.us/growth/ (last visited Oct. 2002)
109. See Nicholas & Steiner, supra note 67, at 667-69.
110. FLA. STAT. ch. 163.3180(7) (2001).
111. See id. ch. 163.3180.
112. See Pinecrest Lakes, Inc. v. Shidel, 795 So. 2d 191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(upholding the lower court's order to demolish and remove several multi-story buildings inconsistent with the county's land use plan, finding that county consistency
with the state-mandated comprehensive plans was not discretionary).
113. See Fla. Exec. Order No. 2000-196 (July 3, 2000), available at http://www.
dca.state.fl.us/growth/pdf/Executive%200rder.pdf (last visited July 3, 2000).
114. FLORIDA'S GROWTH MANAGEMENT STUDY COMMISSION, A LIVEABLE FLORIDA
FOR TODAY AND TOMORROW, FINAL REPORT 11 (2001), available at http://www.
floridagrowth.org/pdf/gmsc.pdf (last visited Oct. 2002).
115. Id. at 13-15.
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final report presented eighty-nine recommendations for change to
the 2001 Legislature, focusing on simplifying planning regulation
procedures and giving the state a more supportive, rather than
supervisory, role over local governments. 1 16 The eight core goals
included such specifics as using regional agreements to phase out
the DRI process by 2003,117 requiring local governments to create
public school facilities concurrent with planned growth, 1 18 and
creating incentives for urban revitalization 19 and rural

restoration. 120
Despite these recommendations, there was little progress in
the 2001 Legislature. The 2002 Legislature has two growth management bills before it: one requiring public education facilities
for a local comprehensive plan, 121 and another that addresses DRI
reform, and water supply and educational planning concurrence. 122 The proposed DRI reform includes exempting airport
construction and petroleum tank farms from the complete review
23
process.1
What stands out in Florida and Oregon is the crucial link between local and regional land use controls, with the clear emphasis on local controls as the "cutting edge." Local land use controls
have not withered away in Hawaii, Florida or Oregon. They have,
in fact, grown in importance and sophistication. Given what the
federal courts-and in particular the U.S. Supreme Court-have
done since re-entering the land use field, it is a good thing local
land use controls have grown, as discussed in Part III below.
III.

Regulatory Taking: Moribund No Longer

Recall that by the early 1970s state interpretation of regulatory taking had virtually eroded the doctrine into insignificance. 12 4 Indeed, one report which followed hard upon The Quiet
116.
117.
118.
119.
41.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See id. at 19-46.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 37.
FLORIDA'S GROWTH MANAGEMENT STUDY COMMISSION, supra, note 114, at 37-

Id. at 43-46.
H.R. 269, 2001 Leg. (Fla. 2001).
S. 382, 2001 Leg. (Fla. 2001).
See id.
See, e.g., Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 962-63 (1st

Cir. 1972) (forest conservation districts); Candlestick Props., Inc. v. S. F. Bay Conser-

vation & Dev. Comm'n, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897, 906 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (shorelines); Maher
v. City of New Orleans, 235 So. 2d 402, 405-06 (La. 1970) (historic preservation); In re
Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d 736, 754 (Me. 1973) (pond shore); Potomac Sand &
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Revolution in Land Use Controls and designed to allay fears that
the revolutionary state laws would lead to successful constitutional challenges, argued forcefully for the overruling of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,12 5 the genesis for regulatory taking
jurisprudence, on just such grounds. 126 However, commencing
with Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City of New York1 27 in
1978, the Court commenced a re-examination of the taking issue
resulting in at least two distinct analytical rules by which to judge
when a regulation goes "too far." These rules form the basis of
today's regulatory taking jurisprudence, resulting in a vulnerability of state and regional regulations to preserve agricultural land,
open space and natural resources - key goals of state and regional
Quiet Revolution laws - which was absent from the legal landscape when state government passed such laws in the 1960s and
early 1970s.
As a preliminary matter, recall that the law of takings is divided into two principal parts: physical and regulatory. 2 8 In the
first category is that which we call eminent domain or compulsory
purchase. Such takings occur when government intends to take
land or an interest in land, for some public use or purpose. Aside
from that public use or purpose limitation, government may physically take any land or interest in land that it wants-the reason is
otherwise irrelevant-so long as it pays the landowner the just
compensation required under the U.S. Constitution's Fifth
Amendment.1 29 No matter how minute the taking-even if it is so
little as the installation of wires on a private building' 30 -the government must pay compensation. As we shall see below, these elements are important with respect to one of the two post-Quiet
Revolution regulatory rules from the Supreme Court. The second
category of takings is, of course, regulatory taking which traces its
Gravel Co. v. Governor of Md., 293 A.2d 241, 252 (Md. 1972) (tidal waters); McNeely
v. Bd. of Appeal, 261 N.E.2d 336, 345 (Mass. 1970) (local business district); Golden v.
Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291, 304-05 (N.Y. 1972) (growth management); Just v.
Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 772 (Wis. 1972) (wetlands).
125. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
126. FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKING ISSUE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF LAND USE CONTROL (1973).
127. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
128. David L. Callies, Takings: An Introduction and Overview, 24 U. HAw. L. REV.
1 (2002).
129. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441
(1982).
130. Id. at 455.
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genesis from Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 131 and Justice
Holmes' "too far" language: if a regulation goes "too far" it may be
a taking under the U.S. Constitution.
A.

Per Se Takings and the Elimination of All Economically
Beneficial Use

The first of these regulatory taking rules is the categorical or
per se rule of Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council 132 in 1992:
if a land use regulation leaves the affected landowner with no economically beneficial use of land, then government has taken the
land by regulation in the same fashion as if it had done so by eminent domain. Since there is no defense to a physical taking (condemnation, exercise of eminent domain, compulsory purchase) it
makes no difference why government chooses to regulate that
land. 3 3 The theory is that a particular landowner ought not to
bear the burden of virtual confiscation, which in all fairness
should be borne by the polity as a whole. Of course, a landowner
is only entitled to that degree of property rights protection against
confiscation of rights the landowner in fact possesses. Thus, if the
regulation abates a nuisance or reflects a background principle of
a state's law of property 3 4 (like a resource subject to a customary
right or the public trust doctrine) 13 5 then government may regulate without compensation even if depriving a landowner of all viable economic use of the land. Otherwise, the Fifth Amendment
requires compensation as if the property were physically taken or
condemned.
In the Lucas case, the application of a state coastal protection
statute forbidding residential (indeed any) construction seaward
131. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 419.
132. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
133. BOSSELMAN, supra note 126, at 8.
134. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-31; see also Louise A. Halper, Why the Nuisance Knot
Can't Undo the Takings Muddle, 28 IND. L. REV. 329 (1995).
135. David L. Callies, Custom and Public Trust: Background Principles of State
Property Law?, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10003 (2000); David L. Callies & J.
David Bremer, Background Principles,in TAKING SIDES ON TAKING ISSUES (Thomas E.
Roberts ed., 2002); David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach
Access and Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375 (1996); Paul Sullivan, Traditional and Customary Revolutions: The Law of Custom and the Conflict of Traditions
in Hawaii, 20 U. HAw. L. REV. 99 (1998). For a case holding custom to be a background principle of a state's law of property, see Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854
P.2d 449 (Or. 1993); for public trust, see Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n,
471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984); Bell v. Town of Wells Beach, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989); Purdie v. Attorney Genenral, 732 A.2d 442 (N.H. 1999).
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of a beach line resulted in such a categorical taking when the law
prevented the owner of two beach lots from constructing houses
located just seaward of that line. The purposes of the statute included habitat preservation and ecosystem conservation. No matter, said the Court. Picnicking and camping-the remaining
uses-were not economically beneficial or viable (the land still had
value) and so the application of the South Carolina statute resulted in the equivalent of a physical taking. Just as in a physical
taking, the rationale-so long as it was public and not private-was
irrelevant and compensation was required.
As the Court noted in the Lucas opinion, such per se or categorical takings will be rare, though certainly coastal zone and conservation area preservation where regulation permits no
economically beneficial use will be particularly vulnerable. The
U.S Court of Claims and the Federal Circuit, which takes appeals
therefrom, have been particularly strict in requiring compensation to property owners whose land has been left economically useless after the denial of Corps of Engineers § 404 dredge and fill

permits. 136
Also, as the Lucas facts clearly demonstrate, state coastal
zone regulations are vulnerable to the extent that they permit no
economically beneficial use of private land and are not shielded by
such as protection of customary access rights as in Oregon, 13 7 and
public trust access rights as in New Jersey. 138 In both Maine and
New Hampshire, courts have rejected attempts to prevent use of
private land in order to provide access to beach areas held in public trust by the state. 39 Moreover, classifications such as the
aforementioned state conservation district in Hawaii, are certainly suspect to the extent the boundaries of the district include
private land and permit no demonstrably viable, economically viable or beneficial uses.
B.

Partial Takings

Clearly the more common of the regulatory takings situations
will be those in which land use controls result in partial takings of
136. Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Florida Rock
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
137. Oregon ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969); see also Stevens v.
City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993).
138. Matthews v. Bay Head of Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
139. Purdie v. Attorney General, 732 A.2d 442 (N.H. 1999); Bell v. Town of Wells
Beach, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989).
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land or interests in land. Here, the courts attempt to balance the
extent of economic harm to the landowner, and in particular the
effect on the landowner's distinct or reasonable investmentbacked expectations against the character of the governmental action. These tests-or at least the most widely-accepted version-come from the U. S. Supreme Court's decision in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York. 140 The Court
used the term "distinct" rather than "reasonable" with respect to
expectations of the landowner, but so many courts now use the
term "reasonable" that the rule has "morphed" accordingly. Also,
the context of the "character of governmental action" portion of
the rule makes it pretty clear that the Court had in mind the distinction between physical and regulatory takings. However, once
again, current literature and jurisprudence appears to have
changed the meaning to an investigation into the values that the
government is trying to protect. Thus, for example, is the regulation for the protection of health and safety or welfare? 14 1 The
Court, in Lucas, stressed the importance of this rule and the
source of the rule (Penn Central),14 2 and has continued to empha143
size its importance in recent cases.
One of the most important questions which courts address in
deciding regulatory takings cases is the denominator or relevant
parcel question: if a landowner owns additional interests in property besides the one which is subject to a regulatory taking claim,
should the court include those other interests in deciding what
kind (total or partial) or indeed whether, there has been a regulatory taking? Thus, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court has recently refused to view a three-year moratorium on all land
development as a discrete segment of property for regulatory takings purposes, preferring instead to view a longer continuum. The
Court also restated in strong terms its preference for including all
of a landowner's interests-the so-called "whole parcel" doctrine. 144 In 1987, the Court also refused to separate out a mineral
estate for separate regulatory takings treatment. 45 However, the
140. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
141. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 210
Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1353 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1989).
142. Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 n.8 (1992).
143. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632-36 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Tahoe Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302 (2002) (Stevens, J.).
144. Tahoe Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
145. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
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Federal Circuit has on several occasions considered only a small
parcel for which the Corps of Engineers denied dredge and fill permits in holding that government had taken property by regulation, refusing to consider surrounding property on a variety of
grounds. 146 Several state courts have also considered the relevant
parcel question, often with different results, but setting out useful
criteria for deciding when nearby (usually adjoining) property is
14 7
part of the denominator and when it is not.
C.

Unconstitutional Land Development Conditions

The U.S. Supreme Court also formulated a rule for dealing
with conditions such as impact fees, dedications and in-lieu fees
on land development permits like building and coastal zone permits and subdivision plat approvals. 148 Such conditions are unconstitutional unless they:
1. further a legitimate state interest;
2. are related by means of an essential nexus to a need or problem generated by the land development seeking the land development permit; and
3. are proportional to that need or problem.
There is considerable debate over the limitations, if any, on
this so-called "heightened scrutiny" of land development conditions. Thus, for example, some courts have limited this scrutiny to
ad hoc decisions and refused to apply it to legislatively-levied land
development conditions. 149 Other courts limit the scrutiny to land
dedication conditions only, observing that both of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions setting out the test involved such dedications. 15 0 These questions aside, many courts have upheld 1' 5 and
146. Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Loveladies
Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
147. See, e.g., Avalon Bay Comtys., Inc. v. Town of Orange, 775 A.2d 284 (Conn.
2001); see also K&K Constr., Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 575 N.W.2d 531 (Mich.
1998).
148. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
149. See, e.g., Ehrlich v. Culver City, 519 U.S. 929 (1996).
150. Indeed, the Court itself so observed in Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd.,
526 U.S. 687 (1999), but stopped well short of saying that the test was so limited, only
observing that the Court had not yet applied it beyond dedications.
151. See, e.g., N. Ill. Home Builders Ass'n v. County of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384
(Ill. 1995).
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struck down 15 2 land development conditions on constitutional
grounds.
In conclusion, the legal landscape is considerably altered in
Quiet Revolution country. The U.S. Supreme Court has not overruled Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon15 3 and done away with regulatory takings, as advocated in The Taking Issue in 1973. Far from
it. The Court has instead reinvigorated the doctrine, clearly establishing both per se rules for "total" takings (landowner left
with no economically beneficial use) and partial takings, together
with a new "unconstitutional land development conditions" doctrine into the bargain. One can hardly fail to notice that the target of the Court's decisions have been, more often than not, state
land use regulatory statutes either protecting natural (usually
coastal) resources 5 4 or local implementation of state or federal resource protection or have been growth management statutory programs. 15 5 It is therefore arguable that a safer haven for
legitimate protection of environmental resources lies in local land
use controls firmly rooted in the tradition of Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.,156 Nectow v. City of Cambridge,5 7 and other
cases which upheld local zoning restrictions in principle while
raising appropriate cautions about how such local land use controls should be applied.
IV.

Conclusion: Energized Local Government: "Taking
Back" Controls?

Local land use controls have not withered away despite the
"overlap" of state land use regulation in some form in a number of
states. 1 58 Of course, the state has always been the repository of
152. See, e.g., Christopher Lake Dev. Co. v. St. Louis County, 35 F.3d 1269 (8th
Cir. 1994) (striking down a county drainage system requirement); Walz v. Town of
Smithtown, 46 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding a total lack of nexus between water
service and road widening); Steel v. Cape Corp., 677 A.2d 634 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1996); Art Piculell Group v. Clackamas County, 922 P.2d 1227 (Or. Ct. App. 1996);
Nielsen v. Merriam, No 40106-8-I, 1998 WL 390442 (Wash. Ct. App. July 13, 1998);
Burton v. Clark County, 958 P.2d 343 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998); Manocherian v. Lenox
Hill Hosp., 643 N.E.2d 479 (N.Y. 1994).
153. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
154. See, e.g., Nollan, 483 U.S. 825; Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606.
155. See, e.g. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687; Dolan, 512 U.S. 374.
156. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
157. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
158. Examples include Hawaii, Vermont, Florida, Oregon, Georgia, Washington,
Maryland, New Jersey, California, Arizona, Texas, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New
York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Their programs are all amply described in such books as STATE AND REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING (Peter A.
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the police power in our governmental system and therefore, local
land use regulation has always been not only subject to state control, but indeed has rarely been possible without state enabling
acts. Nevertheless, not only have traditional land use controls
such as zoning 15 9 and more flexible "growth management" plans
and regulations been used, 160 but there is a growing trend toward
environmental protection at the local level as well. Long the province of federal and state statutes dealing with Clean Air, Clean
Water, Hazardous Waste and Coastal Zone/Wetland Protection,
environmental protection appears to be going local.161
This is a very good thing since it is largely state regulatory
programs and regulations which have borne the brunt of increasingly successful regulatory takings challenges. It is the local land
use regulation which is firmly grounded in U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence following Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 16 2 and Nectow
v. City of Cambridge163 in the 1920s upholding zoning despite
Holmes' language in the immediately preceding Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon 16 4 decision and culminating in the more modern Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City of New York, 165 upholding a local historic preservation land use regulation rather
than a state or regional land use control.
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